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A B S T R A C T
Current neurobiological research in the field of criminology focuses on the neurobiological characteristics as-
sociated with antisocial behavior, the prediction of antisocial behavior later in life based on neurobiological risk
factors, and the ways in which neurobiological factors interact with psychological and environmental risk fac-
tors. Although the use of neurobiological knowledge has the potential to make several criminal justice practices
more objective and humane, it may involve practices that are challenging with respect to stigma, neuro-de-
terminism, autonomy and mental liberty. Four main areas of interest can be identified where neurobiology plays
or could play a role: (1) criminological research focused on understanding criminal behavior, (2) the (early)
detection/prediction of and intervention in deviant behavior, (3) criminal proceedings: to assess responsibility
and inform sentencing, and (4) forensic rehabilitation and treatment settings. In this paper, I discuss the main
ethical dilemmas that arise when considering the use of recent neurobiological advances in these areas.
1. Introduction
Decades of research on criminal behavior has shown that a multi-
tude of environmental factors contribute to criminal behavior (Caruso,
2017). In addition, a growing body of research shows that, on average,
individuals who engage in deviant behavior demonstrate differences in
brain structure and functioning (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009; Yang &
Raine, 2009) and hormone and neurotransmitter levels (Glenn, Schug,
Gao, & Granger, 2011; O'Leary, Taylor, & Eckel, 2010). Behavioral
genetics studies also indicate that about 40–60% of the variance in
criminal behavior is due to genetic influences (Raine, 2013). Moreover,
these environmental and biological factors that increase an individual's
risk for criminal behavior are highly connected. Biological predisposi-
tions influence the ways in which individuals react to the environment.
In turn, environmental factors can affect gene expression, hormone and
neurotransmitter levels, and ultimately brain structure and functioning.
Current neurobiological research in the field of criminology focuses
on the neurobiological characteristics associated with antisocial beha-
vior (e.g., reduced physiological arousal, poor frontal brain functioning,
reduced volume in the amygdala, hormonal deficits and genetic risk
factors), the prediction of antisocial behavior later in life based on
neurobiological risk factors (e.g., low resting heart rate, poor fear
conditioning, increased testosterone levels, attenuated heart rate re-
sponse to stress, reduced amygdala volume, low activity in the anterior
cingulate cortex), and the ways in which neurobiological risk factors
interact with psychological and environmental risk factors (Cornet,
2015: Glenn, Focquaert, & Raine, 2015).
Identifying neurobiological risk factors for criminal behavior does
not imply that criminal behavior is “hard-wired” in the brain or that
some individuals are irreversibly destined for a life of crime. All be-
havior, not just deviant behavior, is caused by a complex interplay
between our neurobiology (genes, brain, hormones, etc.), psychology
(cognitive-emotional mechanisms such as empathy, inhibition, self-
control or the lack thereof) and the environment (e.g., peers, socio-
economic status, access to healthcare, education). There is no one-to
one relationship between biological factors and crime. Many in-
dividuals with biological risk factors will not go on to commit crimes
and some individuals who do not exhibit a specific risk factor may
proceed to commit a crime (Glenn et al., 2015). A wide range of bio-
logical, psychological and environmental factors, and the interactions
between them, may contribute to the risk for antisocial behavior. For
example, the neurodevelopment of brain regions (e.g., anterior cingu-
late cortex, prefrontal cortex) involved in attentional control, inhibi-
tion, executive functioning and self-regulation can be compromised if
children grow up in impoverished conditions.
“The chaotic and impoverished background of most offenders is
unlikely to offer the neurological prerequisites desired to foster cogni-
tive, behavioural and interpersonal competencies. Sufficient nutrition,
rest, a stimulating and loving environment; ample opportunity to ob-
serve prosocial behaviour; consistent rewards for the incremental de-
velopment of self-regulation and empathy for others; a childhood free
from physical violence and access to toxic substances; are not the ty-
pical context of the child more likely to become an offender. These
prerequisites of emotion regulation, impulse control and empathy are
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often sadly lacking” (Nee & Vernham, 2017).
The environment plays an important role in shaping brain devel-
opment and functioning, and due to ongoing brain plasticity, significant
changes may occur in adulthood as well. Studies suggest that cognitive-
emotional training can improve cognitive, emotional and interpersonal
competencies in children and adults (Cornet, de Kogel, Nijman, Raine,
& van der Laan, 2015; Felmingham et al., 2007; Paquette et al., 2003;
Ruedo, Posner, & Rothbart, 2005).
Clinical guidelines support behavioral programs (e.g., parenting
programs and psycho-social interventions) as first-line treatment op-
tions for aggressive behavior problems in children and adolescents
(Scotto Rosato et al., 2012). A recent review study (Balia, Carucci,
Coghill, & Zuddas, 2017) concluded that their findings partially support
adding pharmacotherapy (e.g., stimulant medications and atypical an-
tipsychotics) as a potentially useful therapeutic approach for aggressive
behavior in children with conduct disorder who do not respond to
psycho-educational or psychological interventions. However, they also
report that there is very little good-quality evidence to support the ef-
ficacy, effectiveness and safety of pharmacological treatments for ag-
gression in conduct disorder. At present, researchers are looking for
molecular and neurobiological targets for pharmacological develop-
ment that may provide greater control over self-regulation and ag-
gressive behavior (Asherson & Cormand, 2016).
Non-invasive neuro-biological interventions may have the potential
to ameliorate current approaches to rehabilitation and treatment of
deviant behavior. Although a lot more research is needed, preliminary
research studies suggest that various non-invasive neuro-interventions
can ameliorate cognitive-emotional difficulties (e.g., impulsivity, dis-
inhibition, attention deficits, aggressive tendencies, addictive tenden-
cies) by indirectly or directly rewiring the brain. Neuro-interventions
such as vitamin and omega 3 supplementation, cognitive-emotional
training using computer tasks, EEG neurofeedback or real-time fMRI
biofeedback, and transcranial direct current stimulation may be used to
help prevent future deviant behavior in at-risk children, adolescents
and adults (e.g., Batista, Klaus, Fregni, Nitsche, & Nakamura-Palacios,
2015; Dadds, Cauchi, Wimalaweera, & Brennan, 2012; Dambacher
et al., 2015; Dean, Bor, Adam, Bowling, & Bellgrove, 2014; Konicar
et al., 2015; Micoulaud-Franchi et al., 2014; Raine, Portnoy, Liu,
Mahoomed, & Hibbeln, 2015; Sitaram et al., 2014; Soff, Sotnikova,
Christiansen, Becker, & Siniatchkin, 2017).
The use of neurobiological knowledge, measures and techniques has
the potential to make several criminal justice practices more objective
and humane. However, it may equally lead to the moral acceptance of
practices that are deemed controversial. In general, worries arise about
the difficulty to consistently define the scope and characteristics of
complex behaviors such as violence and aggression and to develop re-
liable measures of such traits (Farahany, 2016; Sadler, 2013; Specker,
Focquaert, Sterckx, & Schermer, 2017). Concepts such as deviance,
violence and aggression are normative concepts and run the risk of
over-including normal variations in behavior as deviant or wrong be-
havior due to societal, religious or other cultural preferences. The risk
of false positives inherent to medical diagnoses in general and to psy-
chiatric diagnoses in particular urges us to be very careful (Glenn et al.,
2015; Wakefield, 2016).
When mental health patterns become dysfunctional, clinical psy-
chiatric diagnoses are warranted and needed. However, scientific stu-
dies do not back the categorization of mental health problems within
well-defined and well-delineated pathologies or the identification of
DSM or ICD10 disorders in terms of biological natural kinds. Complex
mental health problems are linked to polygenetic gene profiles, diverse
neurobiological underpinnings, and complex environmental influences,
and they reflect varying degrees of dysfunction. Most complex mental
health problems involve extremes of normal cognitive-emotional traits
and behavior that exist on a continuum in the normal population
(Livesly, 2012; Widiger, 2011). If we combine these concerns with the
risk of stigmatization and ‘neuro-determinism’, the need for caution and
adequate safeguards becomes paramount: “Techniques for monitoring
and manipulating brain functions are developing rapidly. Prudence and
restraint in their application seem advisable” (Fuchs, 2006, 605;
Specker et al., 2017).
In this paper, I discuss some of the main ethical dilemmas that arise
when considering the use of recent neurobiological advances to address
antisocial, violent behavior. Overall, four areas of interest can be
identified where neurobiology plays or could play a role: (1) crimin-
ological research focused on understanding criminal behavior, (2) the
(early) detection/prediction of and intervention in deviant behavior,
(3) criminal proceedings: to assess responsibility and inform senten-
cing, (4) forensic rehabilitation and treatment settings. These areas of
interest face important ethical challenges with respect to stigma, neuro-
determinism, autonomy and mental liberty.
2. Discussion
2.1. Criminological research
One of the most exciting areas where neurobiological measures and
data are useful is the field of criminological research. Thus far, research
on human aggression has largely focused on the societal causes of
violent behavior and relatively little on the underlying neurobiological
basis (Asherson & Cormand, 2016). If we want to increase our under-
standing of criminal behavior and develop better criminological the-
ories, then we need to incorporate the neurobiological influences on
antisocial behavior. As mentioned, all behavior is caused by a complex
interplay between our neurobiology, neuropsychology and the en-
vironment. If we limit criminological research to the behavioral and
environmental aspects underlying criminal behavior, this will provide
only a partial understanding of what drives an individual to commit
crimes. In fact, recent studies provide considerable evidence for phy-
siological, hormonal, neuroanatomical, neuro-functional, and genetic
risk factors for crime (Cornet, 2015).
A lot more research is needed to fine-tune our understanding of the
biological risk factors for crime and a lot is to be gained from such
knowledge. For example, in the US, developmental brain science has
been used to argue against capital punishment and life imprisonment
for juveniles due to not fully developed brain areas in the frontal cortex
making it harder for adolescents to resist deviant behavior and more
likely for them to indulge in risky behaviors (Cohen & Casey, 2014;
Steinberg, 2013). Neurobiological and neuropsychological measures
can (potentially) be used in criminal justice settings as additional means
to understand and predict criminal behavior, to inform forensic psy-
chiatric reports, to assess competency to stand trial, to substantiate the
reliability of statements of witnesses, victims or defendants, and to
ameliorate forensic mental health treatment (Chandler, 2016; de Kogel
& Westgeest, 2015; Meynen, 2013a; Roskies, Schweitzer, & Saks, 2013).
For example, such measures can reveal brain tumors (e.g., in case of
acquired pedophilia), identify structural and functional brain abnorm-
alities (e.g., in case of fronto-temporal dementia, traumatic brain in-
jury, abnormalities linked to schizophrenia), and in the future poten-
tially inform recidivism risk (e.g., as suggested by preliminary studies
linking brain abnormalities to future crime) (Aharoni et al., 2014;
Brown & Murphy, 2010; Elman, Borsook, & Volkow, 2013; Farah,
Hutchinson, Phelps, & Wagner, 2014; Moriarty, 2008; Volkow & Baler,
2014).
Neurobiological measures provide new and often challenging ways
to identify antisocial and psychopathic personality disorders, and to
expand criminal profiling and behavioral prediction. Research in the
field of neurocriminology investigates which neurobiological features
are associated with antisocial behavior in order to better understand,
intervene in and predict criminal behavior (Cornet, 2015; Glenn &
Raine, 2014; Sirgiovanni, Corbellini, & Caporale, 2016). A lot of this
research focuses on at-risk youth and includes benign research inter-
ventions such as measuring heart rate or skin conductance, taking
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hormonal measures from saliva, neuropsychological paper-pencil and/
or computer tasks, or behavioral training programs for emotion re-
cognition. Other research focuses on parent-infant dyads and how the
development of the physiological stress-system and social behavior in-
teract and are affected by parent-infant bonding (for a review, see
Cornet et al., 2015). The current research field aims to integrate neu-
robiological, psychological and environmental risk factors for crime,
and highlights the importance of a multi-factorial approach to criminal
behavior. It is rightfully argued that “complementing traditional crim-
inological measures with neurobiological methods potentially
strengthens the empirical validity of criminological theories” (Cornet,
2015, 6).
Notwithstanding the huge benefits such neurobiological knowledge
could entail, a sufficiently nuanced approach may be lost when neu-
robiological knowledge is reflected on in the wider academic debate
and the wider public debate. Our growing knowledge on the neuro-
biological correlates of criminal behavior, in combination with the
political and societal desire for quick fixes when it comes to aggressive,
criminal behavior, may result in the mistaken view that antisocial be-
havior or antisocial personality disorders can be reduced to abnorm-
alities in the brain or genes of a given individual. This may further lead
to false hopes about neurobiological interventions as ‘cures’ or ‘quick
fixes’ for criminal behavior. Such a worrisome trend can be seen in the
current academic debate on neuro-interventions for criminal behavior,
as well as in the public debate (see, Specker, Focquaert, Raus, Sterckx,
& Schermer, 2014).
False views on neuro-determinism neglect the importance of non-
biological risk factors such as socio-economic and peer-related risk
factors, and psychological concepts such as self-control, agency and
motivation in trying to address recurrent deviant behavior. By merely
or overly focusing on the biological mechanisms involved in deviant
behavior, we may also neglect or underestimate the need for cognitive
behavioral therapy, skills training and other kinds of support (e.g.,
education, housing, employment) in trying to lead a crime-free life.
Researchers in the field of neuro-criminology have the very im-
portant role of explaining and communicating their research findings in
the most nuanced way possible. It is pivotal to continuously identify the
limits of their research findings in their published research to avoid
misinterpretation and misuse. There is a need to communicate such
research findings to the wider public in a more detailed and careful
manner. This responsibility confers on researchers and journalists alike.
Scientific researchers are bound by the applicable ethical standards
of research on humans provided by the World Medical Association
(Declaration of Helsinki, 2013), the Council of Europe (Oviedo
Convention, 1997), the World Health Organization and the Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (International Ethical
Guidelines for Biomedical Research involving Human Subjects, 2002;
International Ethical Guidelines for Epidemiological Studies, 2009),
and other relevant institutions, as implemented by national law. Re-
search involving humans needs to pass a REC (Research Ethics Com-
mittee) or IRB (Institutional Review Board) to check if the applicable
guidelines are adequately taken into account. These minimum demands
need to be respected within all research, including criminological re-
search. This manuscript does not focus on the established guidelines,
but discusses subtle and potentially underestimated ethical challenges
with respect to the use of neuro-tools and neuro-interventions.
2.2. Deviant behavior: (early) detection, prediction and intervention using
neurobiology
While a lot of hope is vested in the detection of neurobiological risk
and protective factors and in the implementation of prevention mea-
sures for antisocial and criminal behavior, we need to bear in mind that
practices of detection, prediction and prevention may unintentionally
result in undesirable ethical, social and legal consequences or be de-
liberately misused for social control purposes (Hörskotter, Berghmans,
& de Wert, 2014; Specker et al., 2017). For example, such undesirable
consequences may result from labeling individuals who have never
committed a (violent) crime but may be more likely to commit crimes
once identified as at risk. What can be easily forgotten within a criminal
justice approach focused on safety and prevention is that we are dealing
with unique individuals in complex environmental settings whose be-
havior is not reducible to mere neurobiological profiles. Moreover, re-
ceiving a psychiatric label, especially when tied to a neurobiological
profile, may prevent successful treatment outcomes or successful be-
havior change in the long run due to prejudice and discrimination,
stigmatization, fear of rejection and mistreatment, low self-esteem and
self-blame. Rather than lowering the risk of future deviant behavior,
neurobiological profiling may be counterproductive and increase the
risk of future deviant behavior (Glenn et al., 2015). Similar worries
have been voiced by Fuchs (2006): “The possible benefit of predictive
imaging would have to be carefully weighed not only against possible
harm but also against the burden of knowledge and the possible dis-
criminations caused by being an at-risk patient” (601).
Concerns about labelling, stigma and unnecessary interventions are
especially important when thinking of early detection and prevention of
deviant behavior in children and adolescents. While early intervention
may be beneficial, especially in children with callous-unemotional
traits, it is important to recognize that early intervention in childhood
and adolescence can be detrimental due to the negative effects of la-
belling children who are biologically ‘at-risk’ (e.g., exhibit neurobio-
logical markers of reduced emotionality and reduced sensitivity to
punishment) as ‘bad’ children. Although early screening and interven-
tion may benefit some children who are at risk of exhibiting violent,
anti-social behaviors, there is a substantial risk of increasing anxiety,
stigma and falling prey to unnecessary interventions. The stigmatiza-
tion, internalization and self-blame that results from such labels may
subsequently stimulate the development of maladaptive cognitions and
narratives (Glenn et al., 2015; Specker et al., 2017).
Glenn et al. (2015) have previously identified three areas of ethical
concern related to potential screening policies for mental disorders: (1)
the efficacy, cost-effectiveness, and likely ‘false alarm’ rate of popula-
tion-based screening strategies, (2) anxiety and stigma, and (3) in-
formed consent and the obligations between parents and children. I will
briefly apply these concerns to the early detection of biological risk
factors for deviant behavior.
(1) Population-wide screening for biological markers (e.g., in all chil-
dren at a certain age) is only justifiable if an efficacious and cost-
effective intervention exists to prevent the development of the be-
havior in children who are identified as at-risk. We do not know
whether it is more cost-effective to treat those children who already
engaged in violent, anti-social behavior rather than preventively
screening all children. Moreover, even if we have or will have ef-
ficacious, cost-effective interventions available, it is unclear if
knowledge about genetic or biological risk-factors will motivate
parents to seek help. In fact, even if treatment is sought, the
screening results might undermine the parents' hopes to effectively
prevent such behavior in their child(ren). Furthermore, where do
we draw the line between high risk and low risk and how do we
determine if a child is at-risk? The answer to these questions in-
volves a normative judgment that will inevitably leave out children
who could also have benefited from preventive treatment either
because they fall just outside the at-risk cut-off line or because of
false negatives inherent to population-wide screening and inter-
vention strategies. Similarly, false positives will lead to unnecessary
interventions that may be considered harmful to the child in
question (Holm, 2007). For these reasons, and the ethical demand
to address social inequities, screening and intervention strategies
for biological risk-factors in childhood and adolescence should
never substitute the implementation of prevention policies that
reduce exposure to known common risk factors involved in the
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development of criminal behavior (e.g., prenatal and school-based
nutrition programs, programs against child abuse and maltreat-
ment, etc.).
(2) It has been argued that genetic or biological screening and early
intervention is only justifiable (a) for disorders with a high genetic
determination, (b) in individuals that have a family history of
mental disease, and (c) if efficacious, cost-effective, low-risk inter-
ventions exist to reduce the risk (Spriggs, Olsson, & Hall, 2008). At
a minimum, we need to weigh the potential benefits in terms of
public safety against the risks of stigma, anxiety and unnecessary
interventions. According to Shickle and Chadwick (1994), there
should be room for a trade-off between the harm that results from
screening and early intervention and the harm that is brought about
by the failure to screen (and prevent future crime). While we can
have legitimate reasons to opt for screening, we can also have le-
gitimate reasons to refrain from screening. A careful assessment of
the potential harms of screening versus forgoing to screen is para-
mount. According to Spriggs et al. (2008), due to the multi-factorial
nature of complex behaviors such as violent, anti-social behavior, a
greater justification is needed when identifying bio-markers that
carry a greater risk in terms of anxiety-inducement and stigmati-
zation (Spriggs et al., 2008).
(3) If a child who has never committed a crime is identified as at-risk to
develop deviant, anti-social behavior in later life based on neuro-
biological screening, who should decide on treatment? Do the
parents have decision-making authority or should the child have a
veto right? A shared or dual decision-making process creates an
environment in which the child's developing autonomy is maxi-
mally respected and his/her decision-making skills and agency are
nurtured, while enabling the child to benefit from the knowledge
that their parents and the expert team provide. It also results in
better treatment outcomes and coping. Successful treatment and
intervention depends on the individual's willingness to participate
and therefore requires the child's involvement in the decision-
making process.
In general, a number of normative questions need to be addressed
on a case-by-case basis before neurobiological tools are implemented:
Should parents be persuaded to enroll their at-risk child in a treatment
program? Should the government provide incentives for parents to do
so? Should child and family services be allowed to ask for neurobio-
logical screening and early intervention? Should schools be allowed to
refuse at-risk children who do not enroll in a treatment program?
2.3. Use of neurobiology to assign (degrees of) responsibility and inform
sentencing
While the current admissibility and reliability of neuroscientific
evidence data as evidence in courtrooms is limited and risks of neuro-
determinism loom large, neurobiological research may be used in
criminal justice settings in a variety of ways. Whether or not we wel-
come the upcoming era of neurolaw or not, according to some experts,
it will be difficult to prevent it from booming: “…there may be a
coming tsunami of neurobiological evidence-backed sentencing claims
at trial” (Farahany, 2016, 20). Other experts question whether the use
of behavioral genetic evidence in courts will continue to grow in the
foreseeable future and point to the many challenges that the effective
use of such evidence faces (Scurich & Appelbaum, 2017).
Scientifically valid neuroscience data has the potential to make
certain aspects of criminal cases more objective and less prone to sub-
jective interpretation. If the science is reliable, it opens up a range of
new opportunities for the law (Greely, 2011). The US Supreme Court
has acknowledged on several different occasions that psychiatry is not
an exact science and that there exists much dispute and disagreement
among different mental health professionals when it comes to diagnoses
(Morse, 2011). In trying to establish who satisfies specific psychological
demands and who does not, legal decisions easily lend themselves to
arbitrary distinctions between individuals that may have profound and
unfair consequences. Forensic mental health assessments can be sub-
jective and often differ depending on the forensic expert team in
question and their expected role (e.g., court-appointed team versus
defense-appointed team).
The Anders Breivik trial in 2012 in Norway provides a well-known
example of conflicting expert rapports (Melle, 2013). While the first
expert team concluded that Breivik suffers from psychosis, a serious
mental health disorder that could result in a ‘not legally accountable’
verdict by the judge, the second expert team concluded that Breivik did
not suffer from psychosis. The second team diagnosed Breivik with
narcissistic personality disorder and pathological lying. The latter di-
agnosis does allow for Breivik to be held legally accountable. Similarly,
Belgian Courts rigidly differentiate between individuals who suffer
from full-blown mental insanity (e.g., psychosis) and individuals who
merely suffer from personality disorders such as schizotypal personality
disorder (as assessed by forensic mental health experts) (e.g., Kim De
Gelder case, 2013). A diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder will
result in a guilty verdict and a prison sentence whereas schizophrenia
will most likely result in a not guilty for reasons of insanity verdict and
(indefinite) civil commitment. At the same time, mental health research
informs us that schizotypal personality disorder needs to be understood
as a precursor to full-blown schizophrenia or as conveying milder
symptoms that can be placed on a continuum leading up to full-blown
schizophrenia. Where we draw the line between both conditions and
why is a normative matter that is prone to subjectivity and uncertainty
due to a lack of clear diagnostic features.
According to some experts, neurobiological evidence has the po-
tential to aid in resolving diagnostic disputes and providing a more
reliable psychiatric profile (Farahany, 2016; Savitz, Simpson, &
Drevets, 2012; Sirgiovanni et al., 2016). Sirgiovanni et al. (2016)
welcome neuroscientific additions to the traditional psychiatric ap-
proach of observational DSM-based diagnoses in the legal domain: “The
poor quality of data collection and the controversial identification of
disorders within the DSM approach is due to the absence of objective
measurement procedures combined with DSM's vague and imprecise
definition of disorders”. Farahany (2016) similarly argues that re-
sponsible use of neurobiological evidence has the potential to reduce
errors and increase accuracy within the criminal justice system. Specific
brain imaging tests and techniques such as diffusion tensor imaging
(DTI), structural magnetic resonance imaging (sMRI) and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) may provide additional informa-
tion to support or question behavioral diagnoses. For example, whereas
dementia used to be diagnosed solely at the behavioral level, brain
scans are increasingly used to support clinical characterization and
differential diagnosis (Bonifacio & Zamboni, 2016).
As mentioned under Section 2.1, US Supreme Court cases involving
juveniles (Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs) have led to the
majority opinion that death sentences and mandatory life sentences
without parole for juveniles are unconstitutional. The Court referred to
neurobiological studies that indicate that the frontal brain regions of
juveniles are not fully developed and make it more difficult for young
people to resist crime. The studies suggest that “in the heat of the
moment, as in the presence of peers, potential threat, or rewards,
emotional centers of the brain hijack less mature prefrontal control
circuits during adolescence, leading to poor choice behaviors” (Cohen &
Casey, 2014, 65). Cohen and Casey (2014) conclude that juveniles are
fundamentally different from adults and fairness demands that they are
sentenced differently.
The question remains however to what extent adult offenders may
suffer from similar neurobiological impairments involving suboptimal
functioning of prefrontal cognitive-emotional brain regions and net-
works. Such atypical neurobiological functioning may similarly render
these individuals more prone to crime. Neuropsychological research
indeed indicates that individuals with severe, impulsive antisocial
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behavior suffer from deficits in ‘executive functions’ (related to self-
control, attention, long-term planning, learning, etc.). Impaired ex-
ecutive functions are associated with less optimal development of or
damage to prefrontal brain areas (de Kogel & Westgeest, 2015). Ab-
normalities in brain anatomy or functioning that are visible on brain
scans may therefore provide additional evidence to support or question
a specific behavioral diagnosis in adolescents and adults alike. In fact,
some cases may present a rather convincing correlative model, such as
the case involving the school teacher who suffered from pedophilic
urges due to a (regrown) brain tumor (Burns & Swerdlow, 2003). Other
examples may involve patients with behavioral-variant frontotemporal
dementia who develop deviant behavior due to their disease despite
being able to explicitly state that their behavior is wrong (Darby,
Edersheim, & Price, 2016).
With regard to current legal systems, it is morally desirable that
relevant brain abnormalities are identified and taken seriously. For
example, in the Netherlands, it has been estimated that an MRI-scan is
made in about half of the criminal cases involving serious offences. The
scan is typically combined with expert information from several other
disciplines such as neuropsychology, psychiatry and probation services
(de Kogel & Westgeest, 2015). Caution is needed as well. Fuchs (2006)
highlights ethical concerns related to our individual rights on privacy,
non-interference and inviolability. Brain imaging and other types of
neurobiological monitoring could reveal personal information about
our identities, our inner thoughts and unconscious attitudes. Fuchs re-
fers to the concept of ‘cognitive liberty’ as “every person's fundamental
right on autonomy over his or her own brain states” (Fuchs, 2006, 602).
Bublitz and Merkel (2014) similarly discuss the right to ‘mental in-
tegrity’ and how this may become compromised when faced with brain
monitoring and brain interventions. Respect for autonomy and in-
formed consent are therefore crucial to avoid misuse of neurobiological
knowledge.
There is very little to no consensus as to what constitutes normal
variation in the size of certain brain regions and no independent mea-
sure on what constitutes pathology. It is important to recognize that
“advances in the neuroscience of mental states do not necessarily mean
that associated brain regions are necessary for their normal functioning,
and descriptions of abnormal brain activity do not necessarily imply
dysfunction” (Edersheim, Weintraub Brendel, & Price, 2012, 164). Also,
“different brains may have different abilities to compensate for pa-
thology” (Edersheim et al., 2012, 164). Moreover, theoretical per-
spectives influence the methodology and the interpretation of the re-
sults. Objectivity is an aspiration and should be the ideal, but this is far
from always the case in practice. The same neurobiological evidence
can lead either to mitigation or to harsher sentencing depending on the
way the evidence is invoked. It can lead to the conclusion that the
criminal defendant had less control over his actions due to brain im-
pairments and thus deserves a lesser sentence, or that his brain im-
pairments signal irreversibility and chronic dangerousness and there-
fore the need for longer sentences or (indefinite) civil commitment.
Some experts raise concerns about the potential for prejudice or
undue influence of neurobiological information and brain images on lay
persons, mental health experts, judges and jurors, and questions arise
on how to avoid neuro-determinism when presented with persuasive
brain images (Specker et al., 2017; Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson,
& Gray, 2008). It has been argued that neurobiological assessments by
experts are sensitive to the ‘pathology bias’, the ‘allegiance effect’ and
malingering (Merckelbach & Merckelbach, 2014). Other experts nuance
the seductive allure of neuro-images as no inordinate effects are found
that go beyond conventional neuroscience expert testimony (Roskies
et al., 2013).
Recent studies have found either mitigating, aggravating or no
overall impact of neurobiological evidence on culpability and criminal
sentencing (Berryessa, 2017; de Kogel & Westgeest, 2015; Scurich &
Appelbaum, 2016). de Kogel and Westgeest (2015) analyzed published
criminal cases in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2012 and found
that neuroscientific or behavioral genetic information mitigates ac-
countability assessments in most cases. Recent studies from the United
States suggest a null effect regarding the impact of behavioral genetic
evidence on criminal sentencing in courts and among lay persons:
“Thus, for all the potential that some legal commentators and others
have seen in the use of behavioural genetic evidence in support of ar-
guments for diminished responsibility and thus mitigation of punish-
ment, such effects have been difficult to detect in actual cases – with
rare exceptions – and are modest or entirely absent in the experimental
data” (Berryessa, 2017; Scurich & Appelbaum, 2017). Scurich and Ap-
pelbaum give several possible reasons for these results: (a) biogenetic
explanations involve countervailing beliefs, both promoting the idea
that individuals with genetic risk factors should be regarded less
blameworthy and the idea that individuals with genetic risk factors are
more likely to recidivate; (b) lay persons do not comprehend the im-
plications of such findings for behavior and choose to ignore the data,
(c) lay persons do not see genes as one of the primary or even a major
determinant of behavior and consider such evidence as largely irrele-
vant to decisions about culpability and punishment, or (d) lay persons
and judges alike consider genes as one factor among many factors
driving behavior, and claim that this is not incompatible with ex-
ercising control over one's behavior.
To maximally avoid misinterpretation and misuse, it is essential that
judges, attorneys and other judicial experts are trained to correctly and
responsibly interpret neurobiological data if and when it is used within
criminal justice settings (Chandler, 2016; Farahany, 2016). Moreover,
guidelines and protocols for the use of neuroscientific information in
criminal cases “could serve to articulate the state of knowledge, and the
ways in which neuroscientific information can and cannot be used” (de
Kogel & Westgeest, 2015, 591). Meynen (2013a) argues that a multi-
disciplinary team of experts involving lawyers, psychiatrists, ethicists
and neuroscientists should asses and identify the “threshold for what
can be considered a morally as well as a legally significant impact” of
neuroscientific findings on decision-making in order to assist forensic
mental health experts assigned to interpret this type of knowledge
(Meynen, 2013a, 98). Although each criminal case and the neurobio-
logical information that is gathered needs to be assessed on a case by
case basis due to the specificity of each case, such protocols can provide
an objective and uniform approach as to how such knowledge should be
obtained and interpreted (e.g., about pre-frontal brain damage, about
the neurobiology of schizophrenia, about the brain mechanisms in-
volved in sleepwalking), and to what extent such findings impact of-
fenders' decision-making and may therefore be relevant for responsi-
bility assessments. At the same time, it is remains debatable to what
extent forensic mental health experts should make claims about (di-
minished) responsibility, and whether or not such decisions should be
made exclusively by judges (Meynen, 2013b, 2016).
2.4. Neurobiological measures and interventions in forensic mental health
The importance of accurate diagnostic tools for forensic psychiatry
is underscored by the current epidemiological data on the incidence of
mental health problems in offenders. In the general population, 2–3%
suffer from antisocial personality disorder and 1% from psychopathy. In
stark contrast, 65% of male prisoners and 42% of female prisoners
suffer from personality disorders (with 47% antisocial personality dis-
order in men and 21% in women) (Fazel & Danesh, 2002). More than
half of incarcerated individuals suffer from mental health and (co-
morbid) substance abuse disorders (James & Glaze, 2006). Moreover,
70%–100% of incarcerated youth suffer from at least one mental health
disorder and 20% suffer from a serious mental health disorder (Odgers,
Burnette, Chauhan, Moretti, & Reppucci, 2005). According to a Swedish
population-based study, 1% of all offenders make up for 63.2% of all
violent crime convictions, and persistent violence was associated with
personality disorders, substance abuse disorders and major mental
disorders (Falk et al., 2014). Moreover, a large retrospective cohort
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study revealed that offenders with serious psychiatric disorders (major
depressive disorder, bipolar disorders, schizophrenia and non-schizo-
phrenic psychotic disorders) have a substantially increased risk of
multiple incarcerations over a 6-year follow-up (Baillargeon et al.,
2009).
More reliable diagnoses are needed to inform treatment programs
and achieve effective rehabilitation. Based on current findings, ade-
quate forensic treatment holds promise to more effectively address re-
cidivism. A systematic review of reoffending rates shows that these are
higher for prisoners than for forensic psychiatric patients (for a dis-
cussion of UK, US and Swedish studies, see Fazel, Fiminska, Cocks, &
Coid, 2016). Although individual characteristics such as criminal career
and seriousness of offences may (partially) explain the difference, it is
probable that forensic psychiatric treatment and provision of suppor-
tive aftercare contributed to the reduced recidivism. For example,
Jeandarme, Habets, Oei, and Bogaerts (2016) found a significant de-
crease in offences between pre-treatment and post-treatment periods in
patients from a medium security forensic hospital, suggesting that
forensic psychiatric treatment is effective. A meta-analysis on re-
habilitation interventions for offenders with serious psychiatric dis-
orders reports a positive effect of interventions in reducing continued
involvement with the criminal justice system (Martin, Dorken,
Wamboldt, & Wootten, 2012). Providing effective treatment and re-
habilitation options for prisoners and forensic patients are therefore
extremely important.
Despite its obvious shortcomings, the DSM has its merits as a di-
agnostic tool that allows for interdisciplinary communication and gui-
dance in providing appropriate and effective treatment options. If we
consider the risk of false positives inherent to medical diagnoses in
general and to psychiatric diagnoses in particular, and the number of
individuals within the criminal justice system who suffer from mental
illnesses, it could be very valuable to be able to corroborate psychiatric
diagnoses based on neuroscientific markers (Wakefield, 2016). For ex-
ample, there is a growing body of field research that shows that the
high reliability and the predictive validity of the PCL-R (Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised) in controlled studies does not translate to the field
(i.e., in prisons and forensic hospitals, real world settings with real
world raters instead of academic researchers) (Jeandarme et al., 2017).
As the PCL-R is used both to inform diagnoses and to predict recidivism
risk (e.g., a high score may prevent re-entrance in society) these finding
are very problematic.
At the same time, biological explanations for mental health dis-
orders and substance abuse disorders may promote false claims of
neuro-determinism and potentially undermine successful treatment.
Neurobiological explanations “seem to encourage the belief that
symptoms are immutable” and may lead to “prognostic pessimism and a
reduced sense among patients of personal ability to regulate symptoms,
raising the risk of self-fulfilling beliefs in the immutability of mental
illness” (Chandler, 2016). Biological explanations increase public per-
ceptions of dangerousness and induce avoidance towards individuals
with mental disorders, and may decrease caregivers empathy towards
patients (Chandler, 2016). Although the realization that mental health
disorders such as schizophrenia, anti-social personality disorder and
substance abuse disorders can be understood as brain diseases could
help address some of the stigma, blame and discrimination that ac-
companies these mental health problems, it also has the potential to
increase stigma by assuming that these diseases are ‘hard-wired’ in the
brain and therefore difficult to change or overcome. It can increase the
false belief that mental disorders are necessarily untreatable or chronic,
and that individuals with such disorders are ‘dangerous’ and should be
avoided at all times.
A vignette study found that neurobiological conceptions of mental
illness were either unrelated to stigma or increased the likelihood of a
stigmatizing reaction, and supporting mixed results were found in si-
milar international studies (see, Pescosolido et al., 2010). Increased
awareness concerning the biological correlates of mental illness does
appear to increase public support for psychiatric treatment
(Angermeyer, van der Auwera, Carta, & Schomerus, 2017; Pescosolido
et al., 2010). Although the public now appears to “reject old etiological
notions of individual weakness, secrecy, and moral failure” with respect
to mental illnesses, the stigma remains despite increased awareness of
the biological correlates of mental illnesses (Pescosolido, Medina,
Martin, & Long, 2013, 857).
Self-stigma decreases the likelihood of help-seeking behavior in
individuals experiencing mental health problems. It is considered the
primary barrier to mental health treatment and recovery by experts
(HHS, 1999), and needs to be avoided and addressed.
“Deeply embedded in social and cultural norms, stigma includes
prejudicial attitudes that discredit individuals, marking them as tainted
and devalued. For individuals, stigma produces discrimination in em-
ployment, housing, medical care, and social relationships. Individuals
with mental illness may be subjected to prejudice and discrimination
from others (i.e., received stigma), and they may internalize feelings of
devaluation (i.e., self-stigma). On a societal level, stigma has been im-
plicated in low service use, inadequate funding for mental health re-
search and treatment (i.e., institutional stigma), and the “courtesy”
stigma attached to families, providers, and mental health treatment
systems and research.” (Pescosolido et al., 2010, 1321–22).
Pickard (2011, 2014) has argued that taking responsibility for one's
actions may be necessary for the success of therapy as it provides a
sense of agency. Individuals may not be able to learn to change their
behavior if they and those who work with them do not believe it is in
their power to do so. Individuals need to be supported and empowered
to make different choices. They need to be seen as responsible agents in
order to help them change. While blame and stigma are counter-
productive, holding individuals responsible is seen as essential for ef-
fective rehabilitation (Pickard, 2017; Pickard & Pearce, 2013).
Fuchs (2006) expresses concern about the over-application and
over-simplification of our concepts of mental illness if we focus too
narrowly on the neurobiological aspects of our mental life and beha-
vior, resulting in the medicalization and over-medication of normal
behaviors. Atypical brain functioning does not necessarily translate into
dysfunctional or problematic behavior, and neuro-reductionist accounts
of human behavior negate the causal complexity of mental health
problems. Current research suggests that attention for both risk and
protective factors is important to achieve effective rehabilitation and
recidivism. Much more effort and resources needs to be devoted to
enabling offenders to resist future crime, such as investing in practical
skills training, education, housing, access to healthcare and employ-
ment (Ward, Mann, & Gannon, 2007). Too much focus on neurobiolo-
gical impairments and treatments runs the risk of neglecting the sys-
temic causes of crime such as poverty, unemployment, health care
inequities and childhood maltreatment, as well as the protective factors
that may enable a crime-free life. Exclusively or overly focusing on
neurobiological risk factors needs to be avoided.
Forensic psychiatric treatment can be focused on offenders with
mental health needs, forensic patients serving a prison sentence, or
civilly committed patients in secure forensic treatment centers.
Although a combined behavioral and neurobiological approach to de-
viant antisocial behavior could prove extremely beneficial for the do-
main of forensic psychiatry and psychology, little to no scientific re-
search studies on neurobiological treatments for offenders are
conducted. Hardly any systematic research is available and randomized
controlled trials are almost completely absent (Audenaert, Wittouck, &
Berckmoes, 2015; Khalifa et al., 2010; Meynen, 2014; Morgan et al.,
2012). Moreover, existing research studies often suffer from methodo-
logical shortcomings. According to a 2010 Cochrane systematic review,
the evidence base for pharmacological interventions for antisocial
personality disorders is weak (Khalifa et al., 2010). A recent follow-up
further reveals that not a single pharmacological intervention has been
sufficiently tested to merit the label of evidence-based treatment in
individuals with antisocial personality disorders and/or psychopathy
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(Audenaert et al., 2015). A limited number of small-scale research
studies investigating biological interventions (dietary, tDCS, neuro-
feedback, etc.) targeting aggressive, hostile and impulsive traits in
children and adolescents with conduct disorders and in offenders have
recently been published (Audenaert et al., 2015; Dadds et al., 2012;
Dean et al., 2014; Wilson, 2015). Several of these studies report pro-
mising findings and highlight the need to investigate the effectiveness
and safety of neurobiological interventions in forensic psychiatric and
offender populations.
When considering the use of neurobiological interventions within
the criminal justice system, we need to consider the possibility that
disguised attempts at mere behavioral control will flourish under the
umbrella of neurobiological rehabilitation. As mentioned, Bublitz and
Merkel (2014) argue that all individuals, including offenders, have a
right to mental integrity. Such a right is violated if offenders are semi-
coerced to undergo neuro-interventions that impact their cognitive,
affective and motivational capacities. Freedom of thought refers (in
part) to our ability to rationally reflect on the many influences that
impact us, and our ability to endorse, reject or object to these influ-
ences. If proper informed consent is lost, this removes the ability to
endorse, reject or object to the psychological and personality changes
that are brought about by neuro-interventions (Focquaert & Schermer,
2015).
Certain forensic patients may benefit from incorporating (new)
neurobiological interventions in their treatment program (Audenaert
et al., 2015). In fact, offering biomedical treatments under the right
circumstances can increase the autonomy and well-being of offenders
(Bomann-Larsen, 2013; Caplan, 2006; Douglas, Bonte, Focquaert,
Devolder, & Sterckx, 2013; Focquaert, 2014; Focquaert & Raine, 2012;
Rosati, 1994; Thibaut et al., 2010). Desires, cravings and habits that
motivate criminal behavior can be experienced as impediments to
making autonomous choices. Neurobiological treatments that reduce
the internal coercion that such desires and cravings produce have the
potential to increase an individual's autonomy and ability to lead a
crime-free life. For example, Caplan (2006) argues that temporarily
infringing upon autonomy by offering medical treatment (e.g., nal-
trexone for drug addiction) can restore and increase autonomy in the
long run. Thibaut et al. (2010) similarly argue that androgen depriva-
tion therapy can reduce deviant sexual fantasies or urges (e.g., para-
philic urges).
While mental health disorders and substance abuse disorders can
compromise the capacity to be autonomous to varying degrees either
acutely, chronic, short term or long term, having a mental health dis-
order and/or substance abuse disorder does not necessarily imply in-
competency or a complete inability to make rational choices: “Very few
medical conditions permanently and completely abolish the capacity to
make choices, and psychiatry is no exception. Even if patients are de-
tained and have limited choices, mental health professionals have a
duty to help service users exercise what autonomy they have and
pursue their own choices as best they can” (Adshead & Davies, 2016,
76). To maximally respect the well-being and dignity of forensic pa-
tients, forensic mental health experts should always strive for active
cooperation on behalf of forensic patients and maximally respect their
remaining autonomy.
Non-invasive neuro-biological interventions may have the potential
to ameliorate current approaches to rehabilitation and treatment of
deviant behavior. Non-invasive, reversible neuro-interventions include,
among others, vitamin and diet supplements, cognitive-emotional
training using virtual reality, videogames or neurofeedback, and tran-
scranial magnetic or direct current stimulation. If and when neuro-in-
terventions such as virtual reality therapy, neurofeedback and tran-
scranial direct current stimulation, become part of forensic
rehabilitation and treatment programs, the effective use of such neuro-
interventions will depend on the willingness of the individual or patient
in question to participate. Several of these interventions require the
active participation of the individual to exert their effects. Moreover,
treatment outcomes focusing on changing behavior are usually better
when individuals are motivated to undergo treatment (Simpson, Joe, &
Rowan-Szal, 1997).
If such interventions are included in a prevention or treatment
program, adequate ethical safeguards need to be in place. At a
minimum, forensic experts need to respect the deontological codes and
regulations of their profession, which generally include consideration
for the prima facie medical ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence
(‘do good’), non-maleficence (‘do no harm’) and justice. In forensic
mental health settings, these principles necessitate informed consent,
adequate respect for an individual's privacy and mental integrity, and
concern for the well-being of the individual in question. Concern for the
well-being of forensic patients minimally implies that the least invasive
option is considered first, that the intervention is psychologically or
clinically indicated, and that it offers a good risk-to-benefit ratio in and
of itself.
3. Conclusion
If neurobiological knowledge can aid in successfully preventing
future crime while respecting the rights of all parties involved, in-
cluding the right to be treated with human dignity and the right to
autonomy and mental integrity, both offenders and the wider society
can benefit. The biggest gains for neurobiology in the criminal justice
systems are most likely to be found in the domains of neurocrimino-
logical research and forensic psychiatric treatment and prevention.
Gaining knowledge on the neurobiological risk factors for deviant be-
havior and fine-tuning forensic treatment and rehabilitation to meet
those needs, including the development of safe neuro-interventions for
therapy-refractory mental health and addiction problems, can result in
greater recidivism reduction compared to incarceration without treat-
ment.
One of the most exciting areas where neurobiological measures are
useful is the field of criminological research. Research on human ag-
gression and antisocial behavior has largely focused on the societal
causes of violent behavior and relatively little on the underlying neu-
robiological correlates. If we want to increase our understanding of
criminal behavior and develop better criminological theories, then we
need to incorporate the neurobiological influences on violent, antisocial
behavior. If we limit criminological research to the behavioral and
environmental aspects underlying such behavior, we are left with a
partial understanding of what drives an individual to commit crimes.
Neurobiological research therefore provides a valuable additive ap-
proach.
When neurobiological knowledge, measures and techniques are
used within criminal justice settings, it is recommended that sufficient
attention is directed at preventing stigma and neuro-determinism,
protecting autonomy, non-interference and mental liberty, and safe-
guarding privacy. A nuanced and detailed understanding of the ways in
which neurobiological markers may or may not influence behavior is
needed, and scientists in the field of neurocriminology have the re-
sponsibility to disseminate and communicate their findings accord-
ingly. Individuals with mental health and addiction problems are al-
ready facing stigma in our society. Adding a neurobiological profile
may exacerbate this. Scientists, legal scholars, forensic mental health
experts and journalists need to be aware of this and address mis-
interpretation and misuse of neurobiological findings appropriately.
Although early screening and intervention may benefit some chil-
dren and adolescents who are at risk of exhibiting violent, anti-social
behaviors, there is a substantial risk of increasing anxiety, stigma and
unnecessary interventions. Moreover, the stigmatization, internaliza-
tion and self-blame that results from such labels may stimulate the
development of maladaptive cognitions and narratives. While we can
have legitimate reasons to opt for screening, we can also have legit-
imate reasons to refrain from screening. A careful assessment of the
potential harms of screening versus forgoing to screen is therefore
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paramount.
If and when neurobiological knowledge is gathered for detection
and prevention purposes, or as part of forensic mental health reports, it
is essential that informed consent is obtained to maximally protect an
individual's right to autonomy, non-interference, mental liberty and
privacy. If and when neuro-interventions are used in forensic mental
health settings, the deontological codes of the mental health profession
necessitate informed consent, adequate respect for an individual's
privacy and mental integrity, and concern for the well-being of the
individual in question. The latter minimally implies that the least in-
vasive option is considered first, that the intervention is psychologically
or clinically indicated, and that it offers a good risk-to-benefit ratio in
and of itself.
In the last decades neuroscientific research has contributed sig-
nificantly to our understanding of human behavior – both with respect
to prosocial behavior and deviant, antisocial behavior. Neuroscientists
and behavioral geneticists are starting to identify various biological risk
factors for (recurrent) violent criminal behavior, including structural
and functional brain impairments, genetic variants, hormone and
neurotransmitter levels, and physiological indices. Knowledge on the
neurobiological determinants of psychopathy and antisocial personality
disorder is accumulating across international research labs.
Unfortunately, little to no scientific research studies on biomedical
treatments for offenders are conducted. If the criminal justice system
wishes to benefit from the recent advances in the neurosciences, society
should invest more resources in combined behavioral and biomedical
rehabilitation and prevention programs for deviant behavior.
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